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N o t th row ing out th e  baby w ith  th e  bathw ater: B e ll’s cond ition  o f local causality
m ath em atica lly  ‘sharp and c lean ’
M.P. Seevinck1,2’3’* and J. Uffink3
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Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands;
2 Centre for the History of Philosophy and Science,
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The starting  point of the present paper is Bell’s notion of local causality and his own sharpening 
of it so as to  provide for m athem atical formalisation. S tarting w ith Norsen’s (2007 [15], 2009 [16]) 
analysis of this formalisation, it is subjected to  a critique th a t reveals two crucial aspects th a t have 
so far not been properly taken into account. These are (i) the correct understanding of the notions of 
sufficiency, completeness and redundancy involved; and (ii) the fact th a t the apparatus settings and 
measurem ent outcomes have very different theoretical roles in the candidate theories under study.
B oth aspects are not adequately incorporated in the standard  formalisation, and we will therefore 
do so. The upshot of our analysis is a more detailed, sharp and clean m athem atical expression of 
the condition of local causality. A preliminary analysis of the repercussions of our proposal shows 
th a t it is able to  locate exactly where and how the notions of locality and causality are involved in 
formalising Bell’s condition of local causality.
PAGS num bers: 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Ud
Now it is precisely in  cleaning up intuitive  
ideas fo r  'mathematics that one is likely to 
throw out the baby with the bathwater.
J.S. Bell (1990) [9, p. 106]
I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Despite the existence of m any m athem atically  precise re­
sults concerning Bell’s theorem , there continues to  be 
controversy over ju s t w hat the  ingredients of the  theorem  
are, and w hat the theorem  together w ith the experim ents 
confirming a violation of a Bell-inequality rules out. This 
is especially so w ith regard the locality and causality  re­
quirem ents involved. A lthough recently great progress 
has been achieved in clarifying Bell’s theorem  and the 
crucial notions and assum ptions involved1, we still be­
lieve there to  be a crucial gap left open. This paper, 
which is still work in progress, tries to  fill in this gap.
In section II we will present the  intuitive notion of 
local causality  and the way Bell him self further sharp­
ened it so as to  allow for m athem atical form alisation. In 
section III Bell’s form alisation of local causality  will be 
com m ented on using the illum inating papers by Norsen 
(2007, [15], 2009 [16]). We will closely follow N orsen’s
analysis2 bu t in doing so we will unearth  two novel and 
crucial aspects th a t have not yet been adequately incor­
pora ted  in the  stan d ard  form alisation. Firstly, section
III A indicates the  in tricate  relationship of the  notions of 
sufficiency, com pleteness and redundancy involved. Sec­
ondly, the very different theoretical role of settings and 
outcom es in the candidate theories under study  is argued 
for in section IIIB . The la tte r can be ra th e r easily per­
formed bu t the  first needs a ra th e r extensive discussion. 
This is perform ed in section IV, and which gives a m athe­
m atical account of the two different notions of sufficiency 
th a t are in play. I t will use an im portan t source of in­
spiration  th a t has been overlooked in the  debate so far. 
Namely, it will be argued th a t the concept of sufficiency 
first form ulated by R.A. Fisher (1922 [13]) in the  context 
of m athem atical sta tistics throw s a relevant light on this 
debate.
Next, the tools obtained in the course of our analy­
sis are used in section V to  finally give a m athem ati­
cally sharp  and clean form ulation of Bell’s notion of local 
causality. In section VI the novel m athem atical formali­
sation is analysed and it is precisely indicated where and 
how the notions of locality and causality  are involved. 
Section VII m arks the end of th is paper by indicating 
th a t, indeed, the  present paper is still work in progress, 
as the repercussions of our m athem atical form alisation 
of Bell’s notion of local causality  need still to  be fully 
charted  and confronted to  those of o ther similar analy-
• QSIS .
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1 For exam ple, see C avalcanti (2008, [11]), Norsen (2007 [15], 2009
[16]), Seevinck (2008 [17]).
2 P a r ts  o f th e  p resent p ap er m erely rehearse aspects o f N orsen’s
analysis. See foonote 9 for th e  reason of doing so.
3 T h is we hope to  do  in th e  near fu tu re  (Seevink & Uffink, 2010,
[18]).
2II . T H E  IN T U IT IV E  ID E A : B E L L ’S L O C A L  
C A U S A L IT Y
In the section entitled  ‘Principle of local causality ’ of the 
very last article Bell w rote on the foundations of quan­
tu m  theory  (published in 1990 and entitled  ’La Nouvelle 
Cuisine’ [9]), Bell begins his explanation of the principle 
of local causality  as follows:4
“The direct causes (and effects) of events are 
near by, and even the indirect causes (and ef­
fects) are no further away th an  perm itted  by 
the velocity of light.” Bell (1990) [9, p. 105]
FIG. 1. “Space-time location of causes and effects of events in 
region 1.” Figure (slightly modified) and caption taken from 
Bell (1990 [9, p. 105]).
This locates the causes operating  in a certain  region in 
space-tim e in the  backw ard light cone of th a t region and 
effects of anything occuring in  th a t region in  its  forward 
light cone. See Fig. 1. B ut Bell rem arks, the “[t]he above 
principle is not yet sufficiently sharp  and clean for m ath ­
em atics” . He then  continues (see Fig. 2 ):
FIG. 2. “Full specification of w hat happens in 3 makes events 
in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a locally causal the­
ory.” Figure and caption taken from Bell (1990) [9, p. 105].
4 Here we will m ainly focus on B ell’s form ulation of th is  principle 
as presented in ’La Nouvelle C uisine’, Bell (1990) [9]. T h is p re­
sen tation  we take to  be  th e  m ost definite and precise one Bell 
ever presented; it is overall consistent w ith earlier form ulations 
Bell used to  indicate th is  principle. See Norsen (2007) [15] for 
fu rth er e laboration  and su p p o rt of th is  claim.
“A theory  is said to  be locally causal if the 
probabilities a ttached  to  values of local be- 
ables in a space-tim e region 1 are unaltered  by 
a specification of values of local beables in a 
space-like separated  region 2 when w hat hap­
pens in the backw ard light cone is already suf­
ficiently specified, for exam ple by a full speci­
fication of local beables in a spacetim e region 
3. I t is im portan t th a t region 3 com pletely 
shields off from 1 the overlap of the backward 
light cones of 1 and 2. And it is im portan t 
th  a t events 3 be specified completely. O ther­
wise the traces in region 2 of causes of events 
in  1 could well supplem ent w hatever else was 
being used for calculating probabilities about
1. The hypothesis is th a t any such inform a­
tion  about 2 becomes redundant when 3 is 
specified completely.” Bell (1990) [9, p. 106]
A lthough th is form ulation is considerably sharper, it 
is not yet cleanly form ulated in term s of m athem atics. 
P robably  for this reason Bell introduces some further no­
ta tio n  and term inology in a subsequent discussion. He in 
effect introduces the space-tim e diagram  of Fig. 3 th a t 
is adap ted5 from N orsen’s (2009) [16] highly illum inating 
paper.
FIG. 3. Space-time diagram  of the setup Bell considers. For 
explanation, see text. Figure adapted from Norsen (2009) 
[16].
This d iagram  encodes the setup Bell considers. I t in­
volves m easurem ent on a b i-partite  system  (e.g., two par­
ticles em itted  by a source) where each p a rt is m easured 
by a different party, called Alice and Bob respectively. 
The outcom es of m easurem ent are represented by be­
ables A (in region 1) and B  (in region 2) and the settings 
chosen by experim enters Alice and Bob are denoted by 
beables a and b respectively. The symbol A indicates the 
specification of the sta te  of the b ipartite  system  under 
study  together w ith o ther relevant beables in the  space­
tim e regions 3a and 3b.
The logic is now as follows. Consider a candidate the­
ory th a t a ttem p ts  to  describe any correlations found be­
tween outcom es A  and B . Suppose region 3a shields off 
region 1 from the overlap of the past light cones of 1 and
5 See footnote 6.
32, and, likewise, th a t region 3b shields off region 2 from 
the overlap of the past light cones of 1 and 2 (see Fig. 3). 
I t is assum ed th a t (in this candidate theory  under study) 
A constitu tes a com plete specification6 of the beables in 
region 3a and 3b.
W ith  all this im plicitly in place, Bell continues and 
applies his principle of local causality  to  th is setup:
“Invoking local causality  and the assum ed 
completeness of . . .  A . . .  we declare redun­
dan t certain  of the conditional variables in 
the last expression because they  are a t space­
like separation from the result in question.”
Bell (1990) [9, p. 109]
Thus the specification of A makes bo th  B  and b redundant 
for prediction about A,  and bo th  A  and a redundan t for 
prediction about B.
This finally allows for a clean form ulation in m athe­
m atics of the  principle. For now we follow Norsen (2007)
[15] in claiming th a t th is indeed gives (but, see our cri­
tique la ter on)
P (A \a ,b ,B ,X )  =  P ( A \ a , X ) , m
P(B\a ,  b, A,  A) =  P(B\b,  A ), 1 J
i.e., the  conditional probability  of obtaining A  is inde­
pendent of b o th  B  and b given the specification A and 
a, and analogous for the probability  of obtaining B.  Us­
ing the definition of conditional probability  one trivially  
obtains the  condition
P (A ,  B\a, b, A) =  P(A\a,  A) P(B\b,  A ), (2)
i.e., the jo in t probability  for obtaining outcom es A  and 
B  factorizes into a product of individual probabilities 
for the two spatially  separated  system s, w ith each fac­
to r containing conditionalization only on local beables. 
This well-known factorisation condition is thus derived 
from the principle of local causality  ju s t as Bell himself 
stressed7.
In the following we will subject th is reasoning and 
m athem atical form alisation to  a critique. We believe th a t 
Bell’s qualitative sta tem ent in the long quote above can 
benefit greatly  from a more refined and detailed m athe­
m atical discussion th an  available in the  literature , espe­
cially concerning (i) the understanding of the notions of
6 Norsen (2007 [15], 2009 [16]) requires th a t  such a  com plete spec­
ification of region 3a and 3b not only includes A b u t also th e  
setting  a in region 3a and setting  b in region 3b, respectively. 
For th is  purpose he has appropria te ly  located th e  spacetim e lo­
cation of settings to  overlap w ith region 3 in Fig. 3. We believe, 
however, th a t  th is  need not be  done, and in fact should not be 
done. In rem ark  (two) on page 12 th is  is fu rth er explained.
7 “Very often such factorizability  is taken  as th e  s ta rtin g  point 
of th e  analysis. Here we have preferred to  see it not as th e  
formulation of “local causality” , b u t as a  consequence thereof.” 
Bell (1990) [9, p. 109]
sufficiency, com pleteness and redundancy involved; and
(ii) the fact th a t the settings a, b and outcom es A, B  have 
very different theoretical roles in the candidate theories 
under study, som ething which, we will argue, is not ade­
quately  reflected in the reasoning leading up to  (1). The 
upshot of our critique is a more detailed, sharp  and clean 
m athem atical expression of local causality. I t will fur­
therm ore be shown8 th a t th is pays off when interpreting 
this condition.
III. CLEANING  U P THE IN T U IT IV E  ID EA
Let us first com m ent on some crucial aspects of Bell’s 
form ulation of local causality  m ost of which can already 
be found in the lite ra tu re9. Here we will be deliberately 
short because our m ain point lies elsewhere as will soon 
become clear. W hen possible we will quote Bell so as to  
let the ‘m aster speak for him self’. For a more detailed 
discusión of these points, see more of Bell him self (Bell, 
1976 [2], 1977 [3], 1981 [5], 1990 [9]), and especially 
Norsen (2007 [15], 2009 [16]).
(i) I t is im portan t to  note th a t the  condition of 
local causality  is only intended to  be a constrain t on 
candidate theories, and not on the real world. Indeed, 
Bell s ta rts  by writing: “A theory is said to  be locally 
causal if . . . ” [emphasis added]. Furtherm ore, as Norsen 
(2009, [16]) has pointed out, Bell has em phasized this 
point very clearly in (Bell, 1977 [8, p. 101]):
“I would insist here on the d istinction  be­
tween analyzing various physical theories, on 
the one hand, and philosophising about the 
unique real world on the o ther hand. In this 
m a tte r of causality  it is a great inconvenience 
th a t the real world is given to  us once only.
We cannot know w hat would have happened 
if som ething had  been different. We cannot 
repeat an experim ent changing ju s t one vari­
able; the hands of the clock will have moved, 
and the m oons of Jup iter. Physical theories 
are more am enable in this respect. We can 
calculate the  consequences of changing free 
elem ents in a th eo ry  be they  only initial con­
ditions, and so can explore the causal struc­
tu re  of the theory. I insist th a t [local causal­
ity] is prim arily  an analysis of certain  kinds 
of physical theory.”
Note th a t the fundam ental concepts involved such as 
‘beables’, ‘com pleteness’, and ‘free variables’ are all
8 Here only a pre lim inary  investigation of th is  is worked out. A full 
analysis of th e  repercussions of our proposal is to  be presented 
in fu tu re  work, see Seevinck & Uffink (2010, [18]).
9 Nevertheless, m ost of these  aspects are not well-known nor gen­
erally  apprecia ted  by com m entators. It is th u s w orthwhile m en­
tioning them  here.
4relative to  some particu lar candidate theory. This will 
be become clear next.
(ii)  Bell uses the term  ‘beable’ to  denote w hat­
ever is posited by the candidate theory  to  correspond to  
som ething physically real:
“The beables of the theory  are those elements 
which m ight correspond to  elements of rea lity  
to  things which exist. Their existence does 
not depend on observation. Indeed observa­
tion and observers m ust be m ade out of be­
ables. I use the term  ‘beable’ ra th e r th an  
some more com m itted term  like ‘being’ or 
‘b eer’ to  recall the essentially ten tative na­
tu re  of any physical theory. Such a theory  
is a t best a candidate for the description of 
nature . Terms like ‘being’, ‘beer’, ‘ex isten t’, 
etc., would seem to  me lacking in humility. In 
fact ‘beab le’ is short for m aybe-able’.” (Bell,
1984 [8, p . 174])
The concept ‘beable’ is thus theory-relative, and it 
is im portan t th a t the candidate theory  in question is 
absolutely clear about w hat it posits as physically real 
(Norsen, 2007 [15]). Indeed, Bell emphasizes ‘. . .y o u  
m ust identify in your theory  ‘local &eables’. The &eables 
of the  theory  are those entities in it which are, a t least 
ten ta tiv e ly  to  be taken  seriously, as corresponding 
to  som ething real.” (Bell, 1990, [9, p. 100 ]). And, 
” [i]t is in term s of local beables th a t we can hope to  
form ulate some notion of local causality.” (Bell, 1976, 
[8, p. 53]). W hen applied to  our particu lar setup of 
Fig. 3 this implies th a t the candidate theory  in question 
m ust provide a well-specified account of the  beables A 
in region 3. I t should be noted th a t A is not resticted 
in any way, as it can be anything the theory  posits 
as physically real. In particu lar A need not be some 
classical hidden variable.
(iii) I t is im portan t th a t in Fig. 2 “[r]egion 3 
com pletely shields off from 1 the  overlap of the  backward 
light cones of 1 and 2.” (Bell, 1990 [9, p. 106]). Likewise, 
in the paradigm atic setup of Fig. 3 it is necessary th a t 
region 3a shields off region 1 from the overlap of the 
backw ard light cones of 1 and 2 , and, analogously, 
region 3b shields off region 2 from the overlap of the 
backw ard light cones of 1 and 2 (see Fig. 3). W hy? For 
if this was not the  case, such as for region 3' in Fig. 4, 
then  a violation of (1 ) fails to  indicate the presence of 
some sort of non-local causation. In short, consider for 
example an event X3 in Fig. 4 located in the overlap 
of the backw ard light cones of regions 1 and 2 bu t in 
the forward light cone of region 3'. Since X3 lies in the 
overlap of the backw ard light cones of regions 1 and 2 , 
it can influence bo th  A  and B.  Now suppose X3 is a 
genuinely stochastic event, not predictable on the basis 
of the beables in region 3', then  specification of events in 
region 2 could tell about X3 , which in tu rn , could allow
one to  infer more about the events in 1 th an  is possible 
from ju s t the original specification of 3'.
The condition (1) w ith region 3 replaced by region 3' 
- to  be called called ( 1 ' ) -  would exclude any correlation 
between events 6, B  and the outcom e A,  given a and A. 
B ut a failure of th is condition could be perfectly com­
patible w ith local causality. Thus although (1') “may 
validly be described as a “no correlations” condition for 
regions 1 and 2 , it definitely fails as a “no-causality” 
condition.” (Norsen, 2007, [15, p. 12]).
FIG. 4. A lternative space-time diagram  of the Bell-type 
setup. For explanation, see tex t, and compare to  Fig. 3. 
Figure adapted from Norsen (2009) [16].
( iv)  Bell takes it to  be a trivial point th a t be­
sides A, b o th  the settings a, b and the outcom es A, B  are 
also beables10: “The beables m ust include the settings of 
switches and knobs on experim ental equipm ent [settings] 
. . .  and the readings of in trum ents [outcomes].” (Bell, 
1975, [8, p. 52]. Indeed, the settings correspond to  the 
controllable p a rt of some m easurem ent appara tus and 
the outcom es can be taken  to  be m anifested by the final 
position of some pointer (or som ething similar, such as 
a black spot on a photograph, etc.) and these are all 
beables as they  m ust, in any serious candidate theory, 
correspond to  “som ething physically real” (Bell, 1990 [9, 
p . 1 0 0]).
Thus, “[the] “setting” u ltim ately  comes down to  the 
spatial configuration of some physically real m atte r, [and]
. . .  the outcom e too is ju s t a convenient way of referring 
to  some physically real and directly  observable configu­
ra tion  of m atte r, and so [these too] will necessarily be 
reflected in the beables posited by any serious candidate 
theory.” (Norsen, 2009 [16, p. 5]).
There is, however, also a very im portan t difference be­
tween settings and outcom es th a t breaks the sym m etry 
described above. This is a consequence of the  fact th a t, in 
contradistinction to  the  outcomes, the settings are sup­
posed 11 to  be uncorrelated to  the beables A. The rea­
10 A po in t also m ade by Hans W estm an, private  com m unication.
11 T his requirem ent is crucial in deriving th e  so-called B ell-type
inequalities th a t  are used to  p roof Bell’s theorem  (Bell, 1964
5son being th a t “Now we make an im portan t hypothesis: 
The variables a and b can be considered to  be free12, or 
random.” (Bell, 1990, [9, p. 109]). Bell continues: “we 
can imagine these settings being freely chosen a t the last 
second by two different experim ental physicists, or some 
other random  devices. If these last second choices are 
truely  random , they  are not influenced by the variables 
A. T hen the resu ltan t values for a and b do not give any 
inform ation about A. So the probability  d istribu tion  over 
A does not depend on a or 6” , i.e.,
p(X\a,b) =  p(X). (3)
w ith p some density.
This ‘free variables’ assum ption has the  im portan t 
repercussion th a t, despite the fact th a t from a physical 
point of view outcom es and settings are nothing bu t 
beables, they  do have a com pletely different theoretical 
role to  play in the candidate theories in question. In the 
lite ra tu re  th is crucial difference has not been correctly 
incorporated  in the m athem atical form alisation of B ell’s 
notion of local causality. One of the  m ain points of the 
present paper is th a t th is will be perform ed here (in 
section III B and beyond).
(v) Consider the settings a' and 6' th a t are lo­
cated  in region 4 of Fig. 4. Since region 3' (just like 
region 3 of Fig. 3, by the way) shields off b o th  region
1 and 2 from the settings a' and 6' th a t are located in 
region 4, we expect th a t if indeed the beables A' in region 
3' are completely specified th a t the  beables of region 4 
would be redundan t for prediction of events in region 1 
or 2. The reason being th a t local causality  is supposed 
to  enforce th a t a com plete specification of A' renders the 
events in the backw ard light cone of region 3' redundant 
for predictions of events in the future light cone of 3'. 
Indeed, this is precisely w hat Bell’s intuitive form ulation 
claims (see the very first quote by Bell in section II, 
and also Fig. 1). Therefore, under this understanding of 
local causality  and where we take A' to  be com pletely 
specified, we expect th a t (1) reduces to
P ( A \ a ' , b ' , \ ' ) = P ( A \ \ ' ) ,  (A,
P(B\a' ,  6', A') =  P(B \X r) . W
However, th is ignores the fact th a t the  settings a' and 
6' are by assum ption independent of the beables A' of re­
gion 3' (see the rem ark (iv) above). Therefore, if one 
takes this into account, we expect the  m ost complete 
specification of A' not  to  shield off from region 1 and
2 the causal influences a' and 6' have on these regions.
Thus, we in fact expect (4) to  be violated, i.e., bo th
a' and 6' could very well (in a locally causal way) sup­
ply inform ation about b o th  A  and B  th a t is not already
[l]).
12 Bell also calls th em  “free variables — say a t  th e  whim  of experi­
m enters” . (Bell, 1976 [8, p. 61])
contained in A'. Yet, since a ', 6' lie in the backw ard light 
cone of bo th  region 1 and 2 th is would in no way indicate 
non-local causation.
In order to  exclude such spurious violations of (1) it 
m ust be the case th a t the settings should be spacelike 
separated  and outside the overlap of the backw ard light 
cones of regions 1 and 2 (i.e., outside region 4 in Fig. 4), 
and in m ost discussions this is indeed the case, e.g., in 
Fig. 3.
Note th a t the m ain point here is not to  argue for the 
settings to  be located as in Fig. 3 ra th e r th an  as in Fig. 
4 -fo r th a t is a ra th e r obvious13 if one w ants to  test local 
causality -, bu t th a t this is necessary to  exclude spurious 
violations of (1).
(vi) The previous rem ark (i.e., (v)) serves as a 
s ta rte r for the following subsequent discussion. For 
th a t rem ark shows not only th a t settings should have 
a very particu lar space-tim e configuration in a sound 
form ulation of local causality  it also indicates th a t the 
supposition th a t A' could be a complete specification of 
the beables in region 3' of Fig. 4 is an illusion; and the 
same holds for A in region 3 of Fig. 3. This is explained 
next.
Indeed, we can not bu t give up the idea th a t A is a com­
plete specification of beables in region 3, for otherwise 
“one wonders how a and b could possibly not  be causally 
influenced by A (in a locally causal theory).” (Norsen, 
2009 [16, p. 283]). In o ther words, A cannot be ex­
pected to  be a com plete specification of region 3 because 
one m ust allow for the possibility of traces in region 3 of 
the causal past of bo th  the settings, and given the inde­
pendence of A and the settings, these traces cannot be 
included in A14.
An alternative understanding of th is point is th a t one 
is here faced w ith a dilemma. T h a t is, the  following two 
assum ptions cannot bo th  hold: (i) the  free variables as­
sum ption, and (ii) the  assum ption th a t A is com pletely 
specified, i.e., contains the  description of all and every 
beable in region 3. However, th is dilem m a can in fact 
be avoided. Because, luckily, there is no need for a com-
13 T he settings a,b need not lie in th e  forw ard light cone of region 
3, all th a t  is necessary is th a t  th ey  lie outside th e  overlap of th e  
backw ard light cones of region 1 and 2.
14 “For exam ple, some cand idate  theo ry  (and th is  is actually  tru e  
of every serious ex tan t cand idate  theory) m ight provide a  spec­
ification of th e  s ta te  of th e  particle  pa ir which is sufficient in 
th e  relevant sense, even though  it leaves ou t some fact (say, th e  
m illionth digit of th e  energy of some relic microwave background 
photon th a t  happens to  fly into th e  detection region ju s t  prior 
to  th e  m easurem ent) which actually  exists in th e  relevant space­
tim e region. Such a fact could th en  be  allowed to  determ ine 
th e  se tting  a w ithout in troducing even th e  slightest evidence for 
th e  problem atic sort of correlation betw een a and  A. Indeed, 
th is  is ju s t  an  exaggerated version of w hat happens in th e  actual 
experim ents, where carefully-isolated and independent pseudo- 
random -num ber generators are used to  produce th e  settings a t 
th e  two sta tio n s.” (Norsen, 2009, [16, p. 283])
6pleteness requirem ent when formalising the notion of lo­
cal causality. I t is only needed th a t the specification is 
sufficiently specified, in the  relevant sense. This will be 
futher worked out in the next subsection.
A lthough Bell seemed to  be aware of the crucial dis­
tinction between a sufficient and com plete specification of 
the beables involved (see next subsection), he neverthe­
less repeated ly15 stressed the need for A to  be a complete 
specification of the  beables in region 3. The reason for 
this is the following.
Suppose the events in region 3 are not com pletely spec­
ified, i.e., A leaves out some relevant beables. Then a vi­
olation of (1) can no longer be used to  infer some sort of 
non-local causation, for it could well be th a t the beables 
excluded from A influence b o th  regions 1 and 2 in a locally 
causal way such th a t correlations between 1 and 2 can no 
longer be explained by an appeal to  A alone. In order to  
exclude such spurious violations of (1), Bell requires the 
specification of region 3 by A to  be complete. Norsen 
(2007, [15, p. 8]) emphasizes th a t the key assum ption by 
Bell is th a t events be specified completely16 : ” It is only 
because A is assum ed to  be a com plete description, th a t 
the non-dependence of the probability  of A  on the d istan t 
outcom e B  follows from local causality.”
One final rem ark concerning the completeness (or 
sufficiency; see next subsection) th a t is a t stake. This 
notion is not to  be understood  in the  sense of the 
true  m axim al am ount of knowledge concerning the 
system s under study. To the co n tra ry  it is relative 
w ith respect to  possible candidate theories. Therefore, 
the question w hether the candidate theory  in question 
is com plete in the sense of including ‘all th a t really 
ex ists’ is not a t stake (there is no need for ‘om niscience’, 
see Norsen (2007, [15, p. 8]). I t thus is the  candidate 
theory  in question th a t should indicate when the desired 
completeness (or sufficiency) is achieved.
15 M ost notably  th is  is th e  case in th e  form ulation of local causality  
as given in section II above: “A nd it is im p o rtan t th a t  events 3 be 
specified completely.” (Bell 1990 [9, p .106]), and ’’Invoking local 
causality  and th e  assum ed com pleteness of c and A, . . . ’’(Ibid, 
p. 109). B ut also a lready in 1975 in ‘T he theory  of local be­
ab les’ Bell requires th is  form of com pleteness: “However, in th e  
p articu la r case th a t  [A] contains a lready a complete specification 
of beables in th e  overlap of th e  two light cones, supplem entary  
inform ation from  region 2 could reasonable be expected to  be 
red u n d an t.” (Bell, 1975, [8, p. 54]). A nd in ‘E P R  correlations 
and E P W  d istrib u tio n s’, Bell writes: “In a locally-causal theory, 
p robabilities a ttach ed  to  values of local beables in one space-tim e 
region, when values a re  specified for all local beables in a  second 
space-tim e region fully obstruc ting  th e  backw ard light cone of 
th e  first, a re  unaltered  by specification of values of local beables 
in a  th ird  region w ith spacelike separation  from th e  first tw o.” 
(Bell, 1986, [8, p. 200]).
16 B u t in a  different paper Norsen (2009, [16]) m entions th a t,
s tric tly  speaking, such a form of com pleteness is not a t  all needed. 
See next subsection where th is  is discussed.
The rem arks (iv) and (vi) indicate th a t crucial ele­
m ents of Bell’s condition of local causality  have escaped 
careful m athem atical form alisation. M ost notably, the 
theoretical distinctions between settings and outcom es 
and between the notions of sufficiency and completeness 
have as of yet not been properly im plemented.
In the next two subsections these two issues are to  be 
further worked out so as to  provide the m eans for a clean 
and sharp  m athem atical form alisation of the  notions at 
stake; som ething which is to  be undertaken in section 
IV. This fills in the  gap th a t was left untouched in the 
analysis of others, notab ly  the careful analysis by Norsen 
(2007 [15], 2009 [16]).
A. On sufficiency and com pleteness
The above rem arks (v) and (vi) indicate th a t A cannot 
be expected to  be a com plete specification of region 3 
because one m ust allow for the possibility of traces in 
region 3 of the causal past of the  settings, and given the 
independence of A and the settings, these traces cannot 
be included in A (see footnote 14).
Bell seems to  account for this by indicating, in his for­
m ulation of local causality  as given in section II, th a t 
the specification m ust be “sufficiently specified, for ex­
ample by a full specification of local beables” [emphasis 
added]. Indeed, a com plete specification is not necessary 
bu t merely sufficient to  in terpret ( 1 ) as a condition of lo­
cal causality. However, and this is the m ain point, we 
have ju s t seen th a t such a “complete specification” is not 
an option. It is the  “sufficient specification” th a t can at 
m ost be required. We m ust thus focus our m athem atical 
form alisation on this notion of sufficiency.
A lthough b o th  B ell17 (1990, [9]) and Norsen (2009,
[16]) indicate th a t com pleteness is not necessary bu t only 
sufficient, in the m ain discussion of the  notion of local 
causality  they  nevertheless gloss over th is and assume 
th a t A provides a com plete specification of the beables
17 A p art from  th e  c ita tion  on page 2 above ( “. . .  is a lready suffi­
ciently specified, for exam ple . . . ” ), taken  from  La Nouvelle C ui­
sine (Bell, 1990, [9]), a t a t least two o ther occassions Bell m en­
tions th a t  th e  notion of sufficiency is needed when form alising th e  
notion of local causality: “Consider, then , th e  hypothesis th a t  
A  and  B  fluctuate  independently  when th e  relevant causal fac­
to rs, a t  tim e T  — ó — e say, w hatever th ey  m ay be, are sufficiently 
well specified . . . . ” [...]. T h a t is assum e th ere  are variables A and 
some probability  d istribu tion  ó such th a t  (2) holds, [where (2) is: 
p(A,  B\a,b)  =  ƒ ƒ  d \ d ß c r ( X , ß ) p i ( A \ a , X ) p 2 (B, \b,ß)]  (Bell 1980, 
[8, p. 106]) [emphasis added]. And, “It seems reasonable to  ex­
pect th a t  if sufficiently  m any such causal factors can be identi­
fied and held fixed, th e  residual  fluctuations will be independent, 
i.e., P ( M ,  N\a,  b, A) =  P i ( M \ a ,  X)P2(N\b,  A), where [. . .  ] A de­
notes any num ber of o ther variables th a t  m ight be relevant. (Bell 
(1981), [8, p. 152] (first em phasis added). However, despite  all 
th is, Bell did not carefully distinguish  betw een these two notions, 
and in fact seemed to  prefer th e  requirem ent of com pleteness. See 
footnote 15 above.
7in region 3. Here we w ant to  avoid this, and therefore 
will proceed to  give a sound analysis of the  notion of 
sufficiency involved.
It m ight be true  th a t “Once one realizes th a t the no­
tion of a com plete specification of beables is relative to  a 
given candidate th eo ry  there is no further problem  un­
derstanding the m eaning of “com plete” or “full” . . . .  B ut 
it is less clear, even given some well defined candidate 
th eo ry  w hat p artia l specifications of the  beables m ight 
be considered “sufficient” .” (Norsen, 2007, [15, p. 16]) 
and th a t “[i]n a more careful discussion the notion of 
completeness should perhaps be replaced by th a t of suf­
ficient completeness for a certain  accuracy  w ith certain  
epsilonics.” (Bell, 1977, [8, p. 104]). B u t th is is a prac­
tical problem  th a t one encounters when form ulating ad­
equate candidate theories; it is not a problem  for m ath ­
em atically formalising the notion of local causality. The 
reason being th a t we m ay assume th a t a serious candidate 
theory  provides us w ith an unam biguous specification of 
the  causally relevant beables. O therwise the question of 
w hether the  theory  is locally causal does not even come 
u p 18.
Combining the above points, a first crucial observation 
is the  following. The notion of sufficiency should be rela­
tivized w ith respect to  a specific subclass of all beables in 
the  candidate theory, nam ely the subclass of all beables 
in a region 3 except for the  free variables and the beables 
causally related  to  the  la tte r in th a t region.
We thus isolate a very im portan t aspect of the  notion 
of sufficiency involved. It is
(a ): relative to  a specific class R \  of beables (i.e., the 
beables have a particu lar space-tim e specification, 
and they  need not include all such beables the 
theory  in fact allows for!).
The next crucial observation comes from considering the 
following question: “A is sufficient for whatT’ The first 
obvious answer m ay be: sufficient for prediction of ou t­
come A  or B.  However, this cannot be true, as the prob­
abilities assigned to  region 1 need not be determ ined by 
A and the settings alone. Let us illustrate  th is w ith an 
example.
Since we are allowing genuinely stochastic theories 
there could be stochastic causal relevant factors above re­
gion 3 and w ithin the backw ard light cone of 1. Consider 
for example some such causal factors located a t events x i 
or x 2 in Fig. 4. I t is perfectly légitim ité19 in a locally 
causal theory  th a t these events are allowed to  supplem ent
18 See Norsen (2007, [15, p. 10]) for a  sim ilar analysis th a t  shows 
th a t  it should be  triv ia l to  decide in a  given candidate  theory  
w hat is and w hat is not a  causal influence. T his is endorsed by 
C artw righ t & Jones (1991, [10, p. 229]) who w rite  ” ... b u t we 
tak e  th e  po in t to  be perfectly  general: th ere  are no tes ts  of [local] 
causality  outside of m odels which a lready have significant causal 
s tru c tu re  bu ilt in.”
19 See Norsen (2009, [16, p. 12]) for an  extensive discussion of th e  
following point: “T he claim  m ade in th e  local causality  condition
A in determ ining the probabilities of events in regions 1 
or 2 respectively, i.e., Xi influencing region 1 and X2 
influencing region 2.
The correct answer to  our question “sufficient for 
what?” is th a t the specification A should be sufficient for 
rendering B  and b redundant for the task of specifying the 
probability of outcome A  occurring. Indeed, Bell writes: 
“The hypothesis is th a t any such inform ation about 2 
becomes redundant when 3 is specified com pletely” . As 
we have ju s t seen, ‘com pletely’ should here be replaced 
by ‘sufficient’ or ‘sufficiently com plete’.
We thus isolate another very im portan t aspect of the 
notion of sufficiency involved. The specification A should 
be sufficient
(ßi):  for a specific purpose, nam ely
(,02): to  render some other variables redundan t for the 
task  of determ ining some particu lar quantity.
In the next section the notion of sufficiency as spelled 
out via the requirem ents a , ß\  and /% will be properly 
m athem atically  formalised. B ut before we can do so a 
final necessary p repara to ry  analysis needs to  be presented 
in the next subsection.
B. The different theoretical role of 
settings and outcom es
In the m athem atical form alisation above, (i) the  ou t­
comes A, B,  (ii) the beables A and (iii) the settings a, b 
appear as conditioning argum ents in a probability  dis­
tribu tion . See e.g. Eq. (1). However, if one trea ts  the 
settings a and b as conditioning argum ents in a probabil­
ity  d istribution , this implies, a t least in Kolmogorovian 
probability  th eo ry  th a t they  are random  variables, and 
thus a probability  d istribu tion  over their possible values 
is defined w ithin the model: one cannot w rite p(x\y)  un­
less p(y)  is also defined. In o ther words, th is m eans th a t 
the candidate theory  in question would have to  specify 
how probable it is th a t Alice will choose one setting  a\ 
ra th e r th an  a 2, and sim ilarly for Bob and for their jo in t 
choises.
B ut th a t would be a rem arkable feat for any physi­
cal theory. Even quantum  m echanics leaves the question 
w hat m easurem tn is going to  be perform ed on a system  as 
one th a t is decided outside the  theory, and does not spec­
ify how much more probable one m easurem eny is th an  
another. I t thus seems reasonable not to  require from 
the candidate theories th a t they  describe such probabil­
ities. This explains, we hope, the  different theoretical
is not th a t  th e  probabilities assigned (to  events in region 1, on 
th e  basis of com plete inform ation ab o u t region 3) are th e  “best 
possible” probabilities th e  theo ry  allows. T hey a ren ’t .  B etter 
ones m ight be assigned, e.g., if we move region 3 forw ard in 
tim e, into th e  m ore recent past of region 1.”
8sta tu s  of settings a, b and random  variables A, B , A. And 
lest one should despair th a t th is distinction introduces a 
dichotom y not in troduced by Bell, we note th a t Bell also 
a ttrib u ted  a special s ta tu s  to  a, b by relegating them  the 
s ta tu s  of ‘free variables’, m eaning th a t their values could 
be set or changed a t the  last instan t. See above, section 
III, rem ark (iv). This view, we believe, should also count 
as an argum ent against the presum ption th a t a pu tative 
candidate theory  ought to  provide their probabilities.
However, above (section III, rem ark (iv)) it was also 
m entioned th a t from a fundam ental point of view bo th  
settings and outcom es are nothing bu t beables. B ut we 
have ju s t indicated th a t they  have very different roles 
in any puta tive  candidate theory  we envisage, and this 
m eans th a t we should not regard them  on equal foot­
ing, a t least theoretically. A lthough their ontological (or 
physical) s ta tu s  m ight be the same, their theoretical s ta ­
tus is not. And this is crucial. Especially since local 
causality  refers to  pu ta tive  candidate theories only (see 
section III, rem ark (i)). Thus, the difference between 
the two m ust be adequately reflected in any candidate 
theory.
Therefore we adopt the  following point of view. O ut­
comes A, B,  as well as the beable specification A are ran ­
dom  variables and figure as argum ents of a jo in t proba­
bility d istribu tion  P a^{A, B,  A) =  Pa^{A,B\X) p(A). The 
m easurem ent settings a, b appear as labels of th is proba­
bility function, not as argum ents. The fundam ental con­
ditional probabilities to  be considered are thus
Pa,b(A,B\X), (5)
instead of Bell’s P(A,  B\a, b, A). Also, Eq. (3) encod­
ing the ‘free variables’ assum ption should in fact read:
Pa,b( X) =  /9(A).
IV. IN T R O D U C IN G  M ATHEM ATICS: 
FORM ALIZING SU FFIC IE N C Y
T hen how are we to  m athem atically  im plem ent B ell’s 
idea of ” A being sufficiently specified so as to  de­
clare redundant some of the  conditional variables” in 
P a b(A, B |A), where the la tte r are in fact to  range over 
bo th  the labels a, b and the random  variables A, B ? This 
we will perform  next. I t is im portan t to  realize th a t 
two distinct notions of sufficiency are in play, i.e., where 
firstly the label b (or a), and, secondly, the random  vari­
able B  (or A)  becomes redundant for the  task  of deter­
m ining the specific probability  to  obtain  outcom e A  (or 
B).  Each of these two notions will be clarified next.
A. Functional sufficiency
The first kind of sufficiency where one of the labels a, b 
becomes redundan t can be ra th e r easily formalized. Con­
sider a function f x(y) where x  labels the  different func­
tions f x(y). W hen variable y  is sufficient for the  purpose
of declaring x  redundan t for task  of determ ining the func­
tion  f x(y), relative to  the class of all y  in some specific 
range R y, then, given y  the  function ƒ does not differ for 
different values of x , i.e.,
fx(y) = f(y), Vy G Ry, Vx. (6)
This can of course trivially  be generalized to  func­
tions f Xl,x2,...(yi> 2/2, • • •) th a t have more th an  one label 
xi ,  X2 , ■ ■ -, and more th an  one argum ent y \ , y i ,  • • ••
Recall th a t our prelim inary analysis of sufficiency in 
section III A showed th a t such a requirem ent for physical 
theories implies th a t certain  variables should be sufficient 
for a particular purpose and relative to a specific class of 
variables. See the requirem ents a, ß \  and /% on page 
7. This is retained  here: y  is sufficient for the purpose 
of m aking f x(y) independent of x  (thus not sufficient for 
determ ining its value, or for some other purpose), and 
th is is relative to  a specific class, nam ely to  all such y 
th a t lie in a given range R y .
Applying th is condition to  the usual Bell-type frame­
work we have been sketching in the  previous section is 
ra th e r easy. F irs t of all, we will suppose the condi­
tion  (6) to  hold for each of the probability  d istributions 
P afi(A, £>|A), P afi(A\B,  A), etc. Secondly A will play the 
role of y, and thus R \  the  role of R y, and, thirdly, the 
settings a, b play the role of the labels x.
Let us next tu rn  to  sufficiency in the case of s ta tis ti­
cal dependence P(-\x,y) ,  and th a t requires considerably 
more clarificatory effort.
B. Sufficiency in statistical inference
The concept of sufficiency in the context of the theory  of 
sta tistica l inference was developed by R.A. Fisher (1922)
[13].
The basic problem  of sta tistical inference m ay be for­
m ulated  as follows. Suppose we have some probabilistic 
experim ent w ith a fixed set of possible outcom es x G X  
and a family of probability  distributions pe, ô G O, each 
of which provides some candidate description for the ex­
perim ent. Here, O represents some arb itra ry  index set. 
For each value 0 G 0 ,  pe(x)  then  provides the probabil­
ity  of x  to  occur. I t is assum ed however th a t we do not 
know exactly  w hat the correct probability  d istribu tion  is 
for the experim ent and the problem  is to  infer som ething 
about which probability  d istribu tion  out of the given col­
lection would provide a best “fit” for the  experim ent on 
the basis of recorded outcomes.
It is generally useful to  present the problem  from a 
slightly expanded version, by adding the supposition th a t 
it is possible to  repeat the  perform ance of the  experim ent 
under i.i.d conditions (i.e., independent and identically 
d istribu ted  repeated  trials). In th a t case, assum ing one 
perform s n  such trials, the  probability  of obtaining a se-
9quence ( x i , . . . ,  x„ is
(7)
The goal now becomes to  make an inference about 0 on 
the basis of the  outcom es ( x i , . . . , x „ ) .
There are m any forms in which such an inference could 
be casted. For example, it could take the form of a point 
estim ator, i.e., by designing a function r  : X n i—> 0  such 
th a t t ( x i , . . .  , x„ )  would represent the  best estim ate of
0. These details need not concern us now because the 
concept of sufficiency is equally im portan t in all such 
approaches.
To introduce the notion of sufficiency it is useful to  
consider a set of n  independent functions { y i , . . .  , y n} 
defined on X n, such th a t the  equations
y i ( x i , . . .  ,x„) =  ci
yn (•£! , • • • , %n) (8)
always have a unique solution. Thus, one m ight simply 
th ink  of ( y i , . . . ,  yn) as an alternative coordinate system  
th a t charts the  points in X n ju s t as well as ( x i , . . . , x „ ) .  
C learly  it is then  equivalent w hether one provides the 
recorded d a ta  in term s of the  original values (x i . . . ,  x„) 
or in term s of the alternative coordinates ( y i , . . . ,  yn). 
The probability  d istribu tion  can be transform ed to  the 
alternative coordinates:
dxi
Pd(yu---,yn) =pe{x i,...,x„)|— (9)
d Vi
where the last factor represents the Jacobi an of the tran s­
form ation.
Now suppose th a t pg  has the following form
(10)
In th a t case, the  function y \  is said to  be sufficient for 0.
Of course, there are m any choices for such an alterna­
tive coordinate system . It is straightforw ard to  show th a t 
if y\  out of the set { y i , . . . ,  yn} is sufficient for 0 , then, 
the  same will hold for an alternative set { y i, y2, • • •, ÿn},  
provided th a t th is also gives a regular coordinate system.
The intuitive idea behind th is notion of sufficiency is 
th a t all the  inform ation th a t the d a ta  provide about the 
unknown value of 0 is in this case really contained in 
y \  alone, because the probabilities of the values of the 
rem aining variables y2, . . . , y „  are insensitive to  0. In 
other words, w hatever form our inference about 0 is going 
to  be, it seems reasonable to  make it depend only on the 
value of j/l, since all the o ther d a ta  are irrelevant for this 
purpose. O f course, if a sufficient sta tis tic  can be found 
this greatly  simplifies the problem  of sta tistica l inference 
because the num ber of relevant d a ta  can then  be reduced 
from n  to  1.
In F isher’s own words, the  criterion of sufficiency is:
“T h a t the  sta tistics chosen should sum m arize 
the whole relevant inform ation supplied by 
teh  sample. [. . .  ] In m athem atical language 
we m ay in terpret th is sta tem ent by saying 
th a t if 0 is the param eter to  be estim ated, 0\ 
a s ta tis tic  which contains the  whole of the in­
form ation as to  the  value of 0 which the sam ­
ple supplies, and O2 any other statistic , then  
the surface of d istribu tion  of pairs of values 
0\ and O2 for a given value of 0 is such th a t 
for a given value of the  d istribu tion  of O2 
does not involve 0. In o ther words, when 0\ 
is known, knowledge of the  value of O2 throw s 
no further light upon the value of OP Fisher 
(1922) [13, p. 317],
It m ight be worthwhile to  illustra te  th is by a simple 
example. Suppose we have a real-valued outcom e x  and a 
collection of norm al probability  d istribu tions which differ 
only in their location param eter, e.g.:
p e{x)
1
a/27T
- {x-ey/2
It is well-known th a t for th is case, the function
y i = -  Xi n
( H )
(12)
provides a sufficient s ta tis tic  for 0. In general, however, 
the class of probability  d istributions for which a sufficient 
sta tis tic  exists is severely limited; the P itm an-K oopm an 
theorem  implies they  exist only for the  exponential fam­
ily-
It useful to  slightly rew rite the  condition of sufficiency
(10). Using (9), we can rew rite it in to p e(y i, i/2, • • •, yn) =  
P e(y i)g (yi, ■ ■ ■ , y n)- Next, using the definition of condi­
tional probability  this gives
pe(y2 , ■ ■ ■ ,yn \yi) = g(yi, ••• ,yn), (13)
which sta tes th a t if y \  is sufficient for 0 then  the condi­
tional probability  pe{y2 , ■ ■ ■, yn\yi) m ust be independent 
of 0 (because g(y 1 , . . . ,  yn) is), and thus
(14)
This alternative form ulation of sufficiency shows th a t 
once y \  is given, the  rest of the d a ta  (i.e., {i/2, • • • /yn})  
is irrelevant to  0.
For our purposes the following notes are of crucial im­
portance. Note firstly th a t notions of locality or causa­
tion can be kept safely on the bench in th is approach. 
For example, it m ight be th a t 0 labels various races of 
tom ato  plants, and x  the weight of a tom ato  produced 
by a such a plant.
Secondly F isher’s ta lk  about ‘inform ation’ should be 
understood in the following sense. I t refers to  inform a­
tion th a t is ‘contained’ in a sam ple and th a t is ‘a b o u t’ 
som ething. To say th a t y \  is sufficient is qualified by say­
ing th a t it is sufficient for a purpose (inferring the value
1 0
of d, it m ay well be insufficient for o ther purposes!) and 
relative to  a class R y , nam ely all o ther sta tistics of the 
same sam ple space, i.e., all o ther functions of y 2 , ■ ■ ■ , y n 
of the outcom e space X n, i.e., R y =  { y i , . . .  , y n}.
So we see th a t this framework natu ra lly  incorporates 
the  two aspects m entioned in subsection III A, nam ely 
th a t sufficiency of A should be characterised as (i) for a 
specific purpose, the  purpose beign to  render some other 
variable redundant and (ii) relevant to  a specific class of 
variables. See the requirem ents a , ß \  and /?2 on page 7.
F inally  some words about its sta tus. In m athem ati­
cal statistics, one m ight feel, sufficiency is actually  ju st 
a nam e for a particu lar definition. As such, one may 
ask, how can th is be of any help to  foundational or con­
ceptual problem s in physics? However, even in sta tistics 
sufficiency is much more th an  ju s t a definition. It is a 
desideratum . B u t it can be tu rned  into som ething much 
more powerful by form ulating the dem and th a t, for cer­
ta in  physical probabilistic or stochastic theories, certain  
variables should be sufficient (in the  sense given by the 
definition above) for a particu lar purpose relative a spe­
cific class of variables. To th is we will now tu rn .
1. B ayesian  inference
The above approach used the orthodox form ulation of 
sta tistical inference, in which param eters are kept stric tly  
distinct from outcomes. The basic reason for th is division 
is th a t while a sta tistica l model provides probabilities for 
the  events or outcom es x, there is usually not a corre­
sponding probability  for param eters, i.e., they  are usually 
not random  variables bu t labels for the probability  dis­
tribu tions indicating settings of m easurem ent appara ta .
At first sight th is dichotom y between param eters and 
outcom es in orthodox sta tistical inference corresponds 
nicely to  the  same dichotom y adopted above in section
III B between the theoretical roles played by the settings 
a , b and outcom es A, B ? However, in the context of B ell’s 
notion of local causality  we are not aim ing a t m aking an 
inference about the  settings a or b. Therefore we will 
have to  change the perspective som ewhat.
There is an alternative approach to  sta tistica l infer­
ence, the  Baysian approach, th a t does not rely on such a 
s tric t division between events and param eters.
Bayesian sta tistical inference proceeds from a sim ilar 
point of view except th a t now one assumes the existence 
of a so-called prior probability  d istribu tion  over the pa­
ram eter 0. Furtherm ore, the  probability  distributions 
pe(x)  are now rein terpreted  as conditional d istributions
Pe{x) =  p{x\6) . (15)
Given these two assum ptions, it is possible to  provide a 
so-called posterior probability  d istribu tion  by m eans of 
B ayes’ theorem , i.e.,
p{9\x)
p{x\e)p{0)
f  d0p{x\0)p{0)
(16)
Extending this to  the  case of m ultiple, independent 
and identically d istribu ted  trials one obtains:
p(Q\x i, ■ xn ) = _ n
i n
.i= 1pg(xi)p(6)
! pe{xi)p{6)dß
(17)
In the Bayesian approach, the goal of sta tistica l infer­
ence is to  repo rt this posterior probability  d istribution. 
Note th a t this viewpoint does not necessarily presuppose 
a subjective in terp re ta tion  of probability.
As sta ted  before, sufficiency is an im portan t notion re­
gardless of which precise approach to  sta tistica l inference 
is chosen. In the Baysian approach this takes the follow­
ing form. F irs tly  note th a t the  transform ation  (9) re­
m ains valid. Secondly consider p { 6 \ y \ , . . .  , y n) and note 
th a t using Bayes Theorem  th is is equal to
p{yi, ■ ■ ■ ,yn\d)p{9)
f  p(yi, ■ ■ -,yn\0)p(0)de
(18)
Then assum ing y \  to  be sufficient for 0, i.e., assuming 
(14) obtains, we deduce th a t
p{d\yi,... ,yn) = pe{yi)g{yi, ■ ■ ■ ,yn)p{0)
I p e ( y i ) g ( y i ,  ■ ■ ■ , y n ) p( 0)d6  
p e { y i ) p { 0 )
j p o ( y i ) p ( Q ) d O  '
(19)
Thus once the fundam ental assum ptions of Bayesian in­
ference are in place, the  sufficiency condition is entirely 
equivalent to
p(0\yi,  ■■■Vn) = p { 0 \ y i (20)
Perhaps, th is makes the underlying m otivation of suffi­
ciency even clearer: if the above condition holds, then  the 
probability  of 0 , once y \  is given, is not changed when 
the values of y 2 , - - - , y n are included. These additional 
functions of the d a ta  are irrelevant or redundant for the 
purpose of assigning the posterior probability. In accor­
dance w ith the above terminology, th is is expressed as: 
2/1 is sufficient for the purpose of rendering some set of 
o ther variables redundant relative to  a class of variables 
Ry  {2/15 • • • ; V n \■
I t should also now be clear how this condition would 
fit in w ith the usual Bell-type framework we have been 
sketching in the section II (e.g., see Fig. 3). F irs t of all, 
we will suppose the condition (20) to  hold for each of 
the probability  distributions labeled by the settings a, b. 
Secondly, A will play the role of y  1 , and each of the yi 
(i 1) should be one of the o ther random  variables in 
the candidate theory  in question, for example one of the 
settings A, B,  or some other beable specification A'. The 
role R y is thus taken  over by R \ . T h ird ly  0 is one of the 
outcom es A, B.
Now, although obviously A is not a d a tum  nor a func­
tion of the  data , it is still assum ed to  be a random  vari­
able. I t has a value, and although it will in general be 
hidden for us we can reason about the  hypothetical case
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th a t we would know its value. Perhaps one m ight won­
der if the identification 0 w ith the outcom es A, B  is a 
valid move to  make. After all, we have in troduced the 
variables y \ , . . . ,  yn as functions on the space of outcom es 
X n, whereas 0 labelled probability  d istributions. B ut in 
a Baysian approach this distinction does not count as 
fundam ental anymore. As is clear from (20) we are ba­
sically dealing w ith probability  distributions on 0  x X n, 
and bo th  0 and yi can be seen as functions on th is larger 
space.
By now we have gathered enough m athem atically  clean 
and precise tools to  explicate Bells’ intuitive notion of 
local causality  and th is will be carefully outlined in the 
next section.
V . TH E BA BY : BELL’S LOCAL C A U SA LITY  
‘M ATHEM ATICALLY SH A R P A N D  C LEA N ’
section th is entails th a t functional sufficiency (6) renders 
the label b and sta tistical sufficiency (20) the random  
variable B  redundant for prediction of Pa¡b(A\B , A). For 
determ ining the probability  of obtaining outcom e B  a 
com pletely analogous analysis obtains so th a t we finally 
get the  m athem atically  sharp  and clean form ulation of 
the condition of local causality:
Pa,b(A\B, X) =  Pa(A\X),
Pa,b(B\A,X) = P b(B\X),
from which one trivially  obtains factorisability:
Pa,b(A,B\X) =  P a(A\X) Pb(B\X).  (22)
A lthough ra th e r sim ilar to  (1), which in section II was 
claimed to  be the m athem atical expression of the  condi­
tion local causality, the  differences and alternative deriva­
tion are crucial.
Recall th a t our analysis of sufficiency showed th a t such 
a requirem ent for physical theories implies th a t certain  
variables should be sufficient (in one of the  two senses 
given above) for a particu lar purpose relative to  a spe­
cific class of variables. We have argued th a t then  (6) 
and (20) can be obtained as m athem atical criteria  when 
dealing w ith, respectively, labels a ttached  to  functions 
and random  variables th a t are to  be conditioned on.
In Bell’s conditionn of local causality  it is the beable 
specification A th a t is supposed to  be sufficient. Thus in 
order to  analyse this condition as a sufficiency criterion, 
we m ust, firstly  indicate the  purpose for which A is suffi­
cient (per requirem ent ß\  and ß 2) and, secondly, indicate 
relative to  which beable class this is so, i.e., to  indicate 
the  range R \  of allowable A (per requirem ent a).
We believe th a t by now it should come as no surprise 
th a t our proposal is the following: Consider again Fig.
2. A candidate theory  will be said to  be locally causal 
when, if region 1 is space-like separated  from region 2, 
the  theory  provides a specification A in a region 3 th a t 
shields off region 2 from the overlap of the back-ward 
light cones of 1 and 2, th a t is sufficient, in the  sense of
(6) and (20), for the  purpose of rendering the beables in 
the  far-away region 2 redundant for the task  of predicting 
the probabilities of events in region 1, where A is relative 
to  the  class of all allowable beable specifications th a t can 
be given about a region 3 (according to  the candidate 
theory  and consistent w ith the ‘free variables’ assum p­
tion), i.e., R \  contains all allowable beable specifications 
in th is region 3.
If we now apply this to  the  stan d ard  b i-partite  setup of 
Fig. 3 we obtain  th a t if the  candidate theory  in question 
obeys local causality  then  the theory  provides a beables 
specification A in region 3a th a t is sufficient for the  pur­
pose of rendering the far-away outcom e B  and setting  b 
redundant for the  task  of determ ining the probabilities of 
obtaining A,  and th is is so relative to  all o ther allowable 
beable specifications R \  the  candidate theory  in question 
provides for region 3a. Using the results of the  previous
VI. N O T TH R O W IN G  OUT THE B A B Y  W ITH  
TH E BATHW ATER
A. Remarks
(o n e ) All this m ight look like an overcom plicated way to  
obtain  the already well-known, i.e., som ething sim ilar to
(1), bu t we have in fact obtained quite a lot: a m athem at­
ically clean form ulation (21) th a t brings to  the  forefront 
crucial aspects otherwise left out. The formalisation, 
firstly, encodes the particu lar notions of sufficiency and 
redundancy th a t are involved, secondly, incorporates the 
theoretical d istinction  between outcom es (random  vari­
ables) and settings (labels) enforced by the ‘free variables’ 
assum ption, and finally, indicates rigourously where the 
constrain ts set by the notions of locality and causality 
enter the m athem atical formalisation.
This la tte r point has not been stressed before and 
needs some elaboration. Note th a t the m athem atical 
form alisation of sufficiency itself needs no requirem ent 
w hat so ever of locality or causality, as can be deduced 
from the formal analysis of section IV. We m ust thus 
look elsewhere, and here is our proposal. W hen applying 
bo th  sta tistical and functional sufficiency to  the setup of 
Fig. 3, requirem ents of locality and causation necessarily 
come in play when fullfilling the requirem ents (a) and 
(ßi )  and (ß2) of section III A, page 7.
Firstly, it is by an appeal to  the principle th a t causality 
can only be local in the sense of Fig. 1, th a t the  purpose 
for which A is sufficient is specified. Indeed, because lo­
cal causality  stipulates th a t causes operating  in a certain  
region in space-tim e m ust lie in the  backw ard light cone 
of th a t region and effects of anything occuring in th a t re­
gion can only lie in its forward light cone, we get the in­
ference th a t anything outside the backw ard and forward 
light cone of th a t particu lar space-tim e region should be 
causally redundant. See Fig. 1 and the very first quote 
by Bell in section II. B ut in order to  distinguish mere
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correlation from causal influence, it is, secondly, th a t the 
range R \  of allowable beable specifications is restricted  
by considerations regarding locality and causality. The 
beables in R \  m ust lie in a spacetim e region w ith specific 
characteristics, nam ely it m ust shield off the overlap of 
the light cones of region 1 and 2 from these same regions 
1 and 2. The possibility of spurious violations of local 
causality  m entioned in rem ark (iii) on page 4 is in this 
way elim inated.
In conclusion, local causality  is not a mere s ta tis ti­
cal no-correlations requirem ent; to  the  co n tra ry  it has a 
substan tia l relation to  the relativistic causal s truc tu re  of 
Fig. 2. See also Norsen (2007, [15]) who extensively ar­
gues for this point. According to  our analysis presented 
here, Bell’s condition of local causality  is a special form of 
s ta tistical and functional sufficiency, where the purpose 
for which A is claim ed to  be sufficient, and the range of 
validity (the class R \  of beable specifications to  which it 
is relative) are m otivated by locality and causality  con­
strain ts.
It is im portan t to  realize th a t the notions of locality 
and causality  referred to  here involve nothing bu t the 
special relativistic causal s truc tu re  as exemplified in the 
light cone s tructu re  of Fig. 1. Im p o rtan tly  there is 
no need for some philosophical theory  of causation or 
an appeal to  the problem atic notion of Reichenbach’s 
Principle of the Common Cause, or the like (see also 
Norsen (2007, [15])).
(tw o ) It is only A th a t is supposed to  be sufficient, and 
not A plus one or b o th  of the settings. O f course the 
settings a and b are needed to  determ ine the outcom es 
A  and B  respectively, bu t, rem em ber, prediction of 
outcom es of m easurem ent is not the  purpose for which 
A is supposed to  be sufficient!
As was m entioned in footnote 6, Norsen (2007 [15], 
2009 [16]) does include the local setting  in the  specifi­
cation of the  beables th a t are supposed to  render some 
o ther beables in a space-like separated  region redundant. 
However, this is not needed, and in fact even unw anted20. 
For, after all, w hat should be in R \ ? Only those beables 
whose causal past could be correlated, in the  sense of 
Fig. 1 and according to  the candidate theory  in question, 
to  the causal past of the beables th a t are to  be rendered 
redundant, i.e., the  beables in region 2, such as B , b. Be­
ing free variables the  local settings should thus not be in 
R \ , as the following exam ple shows.
If including a in the beable specification of region 3 
could be relevant to  render 6, B  in region 2 redundant 
for prediction of the probability  to  obtain  A, then  
there needs to  be a genuine possibility in the candidate 
theory  under study  for correlations between the causal 
past of a and the events in region 2 (see Fig. 2 and 
Fig. 3). However, th is is excluded by the ‘free variables’
20 Also, it should be m entioned th a t  Bell him self explicitly refrains 
from  doing th is. See Fig. (6.6) of Bell (1990 [9, p. 108]).
assum ption. We can th ink  of a being chosen a t the 
very last instan t, and therefore (in any locally causal 
theory) a can make no difference as to  w hether beables 
in space-like separated  region 2 are, or are not redun­
dan t for prediction of obtaining outcom e A  in region 
1. Furtherm ore, from a m athem atical point of view, 
including a in R \  makes no difference and is therefore 
b e tte r left out.
( th r e e )  One could proceed in a two step  proce­
dure to  obtain  the m athem atical form ulation of local 
causality  (21) and the condition of factorisability (22), 
by firstly requiring sta tistica l sufficiency (6) so as to  
obtain,
Pa,b(A\B, A) = P a¡b(A\X) , , . 
Pa,b(B\A, A) = P a¡b(B\X), W
and only then  functional sufficiency (20) to  subsequently 
get:
P a,b(A\X) =  Pa(A\X), 
Pa,b(B\X) =  Pb(B |A) . W
These two requirem ents together indeed im ply (21) and 
(22 ).
It m ight be tem pting  to  th ink  of each of these two 
conditions (23) and (24) as im plem enting a different 
weaker assum ption th an  local causality  itself. For after 
all it is the conjunction of the two th a t gives the  desired 
condition (21). Logically th is is indeed true. B ut despite 
this theoretical difference, the physical s ta tu s  of the two 
conditions is exactly the  same. B oth  are a consequence 
of local causality, and the appeal to  notions of locality 
and causality  used in im plem enting the functional and 
sta tistical sufficiency are ju s t the same, see rem ark 
(one) above. Elsewhere this will be further argued for 
(Seevinck & Uffink, 2010, [18]) and the com parison to  
a sim ilar famous tw o-step procedure by Ja r re tt  (1984,
[14]) and Shimony (1984, [19]) will be there presented.
( fo u r)  O rthodox quantum  m echanics violates (22). 
Indeed, as is well-known, the  quantum  mechanical 
predictions using the singlet s ta te  can be easily used to  
provide such a violation. A closer look reveals th a t the 
theory  violates sta tistica l sufficiency because it violates
(23), bu t it obeys (24) and thereby functional sufficiency.
From  this we can conclude th a t quantum  mechanics 
does not provide a beable specification A in region 3 w ith 
the correct characteristics, i.e., the theory  is unable to  
provide a specification of beables in any appropriate  re­
gion 3 such th a t the  outcom e B  always becomes redun­
dan t for the probability  of determ ining outcom e A.
It is tem pting to  draw  more grand conclusions th an  
this one, say, of a som ew hat foundational, philosophical 
or m eta-physical nature . We will refrain from doing 
th a t here, bu t in rem ark (six) below we will address the 
controversial question of w hat legitim ate conclusions can 
be draw n from violations of local causality.
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(five) The qualification of the  class of beables R \  
is essential because we m ust carefully ensure th a t no 
spurious violations of local causality  are allowed for, 
and a t the  same tim e th a t we do not encode too  much 
in the  specification A so as to  come into conflict w ith 
the ‘free variables’ assum ption. Therefore, as was 
shown earlier, the  specification cannot be taken  to  be 
complete, as some free variables m ust probably  be left 
out, yet it m ust be allowed to  range over all o ther 
beable specifications the candidate theory  in question 
allows for. This justifies calling the specification of A 
‘sufficiently com plete’, m eaning th a t nothing causally 
relevant th a t is not ‘free’ from the candidate theory  
under consideration is left out, w ithout claiming the 
specification to  be com plete in the  sense th a t everything 
in the  theory  is included, including the free variables. 
This ensures th a t the spurious violations of rem ark (iii) 
and (iv) can not occur, and th a t local causality  is not 
ju s t a mere no-correlations condition.
(s ix ) Suppose (21) fails, how are we to  in terpret 
this? Well, given our rem arks above, there seems to  be 
only one option, nam ely th a t local causality  is violated,
i.e., there m ust be some non-local causation present in 
the  candidate theory  under study.
We cannot blaim  a violation of (21) on the specification 
A not being sufficiently well-specified, for as was ju s t ar­
gued in rem ark (five) above, R \  ranges over all allowable 
beable descriptions and should be regarded ‘sufficiently 
com plete’.
Nor can we blaim  such a violation on the existence 
of ‘locally explicable’ correlations. The space-tim e struc­
tu re  of Fig. 3 and the further specification of local causal­
ity  via the notion of sufficiency, including the require­
m ents (a ), (ß i) and (ß2), excludes any spurious viola­
tions of (2 1 ) due to  correlations th a t do allow a locally 
causal explanation. This we argued for in section III.
The question then  arises w hat it (philosophically, 
meta-physically) m eans for local causality  to  be violated. 
Such an investigation will be perform ed elsewhere [18].
As a final rem ark we wish to  present a point m ade by 
Norsen (2009, [16, p. 12])21 concerning a violation of (21): 
“It isn’t  necessarily th a t som ething in region 2 is causally 
influencing som ething in region 1, or vice versa. I t is 
always possible th a t there is some other event, neither 
in region 1 nor region 2 , which was not determ ined by 
[A], and which itself causally influences bo th  [beables in 
region 1] and [in region 2]. The point is, though, th a t this 
causal influence would have to  be non-local (i.e., would 
have to  violate the  special relativistic causal struc tu re  
sketched in [Fig. 2].”
V II . E N V O I
Have we throw n out the baby w ith the bathw ater?  We 
believe not, as our cleaning up of the intuitive idea of 
local causality  for m athem atics has proven to  be fruitful 
and to  clarify h itherto  unknown aspects of the notion 
of local causality. I t should be seen as a complement 
to  N orsen’s m anuscripts (2007 [15], 2009 [16]) taking his 
analysis a step  further.
Also, we believe th a t our m athem atical form alisation 
of Bell’s notion of local causality  further unearths its rich 
conceptual background, and th a t it thereby brings us a 
bit closer to  answering the hard  and open foundational 
questions th a t arise from attem p ts  to  incorporate viola­
tions of local causality  into our physical worldview.
W hat critical light th is novel m athem atical formalisa­
tion throw s on o ther in terp re ta tion  and m otivations of 
Bell’s notion of local causality  is still to  be worked out. 
This we hope to  unearth  in the near future (Seevinck & 
Uffink, 2010, [18]).
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